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FIFTH AMENDMENT-DOUBLE JEOPARDY
United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332 (1975)
United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358 (1975)
Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377 (1975)
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control Act of
1970' amends the Criminal Appeals Act, allowing
the Government to appeal all decisions terminating a
prosecution in favor of a defendant where not barred
by the constitutional provision against double
jeopardy.2 In three recent cases, United States z.
Wilson,' United States v. Jenkins," and Set[ass v.
United States, I the Supreme Court has indicated the
extent to which Government appeals are permissible
under the, newly amended act. All involved the
dismissal of an indictment, but at varying stages of
the prosecution.
Prior to 1907 no writ of error 'was available to the
Government from a decision terminating a criminal
prosecution.' The original Criminal Appeals Act'
provided for Government appeal from a decision
sustaining a plea in bar 9 when the defendent had not
been placed in jeopardy, and from a dismissal
resulting from the insufficiency of the indictment to
charge an offense or from the invalidity of the statute
118 U.S.C. §3731 (1970) provides in part:
In a criminal case an appeal by the United States shall
lie to a court of appeals from a decision, judgment, or
order of a district court dismissing an indictment or
information as to any one or more counts, except
that no appeal shall lie where the double jeopardy
clause of the United States Constitution prohibits fur-
ther prosecution....
2,,... nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3420 U.S. 332 (1975).
4420 U.S. 358 (1975).
'420 U.S. 377 (1975).
'The writ of error, equivalent to the right of appeal, was
abolished in 1928. Act of Jan. 31, 1928, ch. 14, 45 Stat. 54.
7 The Supreme Court in United States v. Sanges, 144
U.S. 310 (1892), held that afiy Government appeal rights in
criminal proceedings must arise from express statutory
provision. The judgment of the Court was based on the
common law.
'Act of March 2, 1907, ch. 2564, 34 Stat. 1246.
'A plea in bar is generally described as a defense which
is capable of determination without the trial of the general
issue. United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267, 301 (1970).
The Supreme Court has divided on the question of the
extent of the category, leaving the meaning of the plea in
bar in American law uncertain. See United States v.
Mersky, 361 U.S. 431 (1960).
upon which the indictment was based. In 1928 the
act was changed to substitute right of appeal for writ
of error."° In 1942 the Government's appeal rights
were expanded to include arrest of judgments." In
1948 the act was reworded to correspond to the
language of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure."' Although the 1948 version of the
Criminal Appeals Act seemed to greatly expand
Government appeal rights," the courts held
otherwise. ' The act was further amended in 1968 to
allow an appeal of some pretrial motions to suppress
property. "
In urging the passage of the 1971 bill amending
the Criminal Appeals Act, the Senate Judiciary
Committee discussed two growing tendencies in the
area of federal criminal law which increasingly were
thwarting a prosecutor's case. " First, discovery
rights were being expanded, and courts were tending
more often to dismiss cases in which discovery orders
were not fully complied with. " Second, an increas-
ing number of criminal actions were requiring court
review of administrative records. Some courts of
appeals had, prior to the enactment of the 1971 bill,
treated pretrial dismissals based on information
contained in administrative files as outside the scope
" See note 6 supra.
"Act of May 9, 1942, ch. 295, 56 Stat. 271.
"Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 235, § 3731, 62 Stat. 844.
'362 Stat. 844 provided in part:
An appeal may be taken by and on behalf of the
United States from the district courts to a court of ap-
peals in all criminal cases, in the following instances:
From a decision or judgment setting aside, or dis-
missing any indictment or information, or any count
thereof except where a direct appeal to the Supreme
Court of the United States is provided by this sec-
tion....
"In United States v. Apex Distrib. Co., 270 F.2d 747
(9th Cir. 1959), the court held that the legislative history of
the amendments to the Criminal Appeals Act indicated that
Congress had not intended to expand the scope of Govern-
ment appeals, but simply to substitute more modern
terminology.
"Act of June 19, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 1301,
82 Stat. 237.
'IS. REP. No. 1296, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1970).
"See United States v. Apex Distrib. Co., 270 F.2d 747
(9th Cir. 1959).
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of Government appeals. 18 The 1971 amendment
gained additional impetus by a 1970 Supreme Court
decision expressing dissatisfaction with the Criminal
Appeals Act as it stood then. The Court termed it a
"failure." "
The Senate Committee on the Judiciary enumer-
ated five principal purposes of the amendment.2"
First, the amendment is intended to abolish the
archaic terminology of the Criminal Appeals Act.
Second, Government appeal of any decision favora-
ble to the defendant, except an acquittal, is endorsed.
Third, the amendment provides for limited appeals
of suppression orders. Fourth, most Government
appeals are to be taken to the courts of appeals,
rather than to the Supreme Court. Fifth, a liberal
construction of the Criminal Appeals Act is re-
quested.
Of principal interest to this case note is the second
purpose of the amendment, providing for Govern-
ment appeal of any decision terminating a prosecu-
tion, except an acquittal. The text of the Senate
report makes it clear that the bill allows all Govern-
ment appeals not barred by the Constitution. The
Senate committee expressed its view that only ap-
peals from acquittals are barred by the fifth amend-
ment, a true acquittal being a decision "based upon
the insufficiency of the evidence to prove an element
of the offense."'"
In three decisions, the Supreme Court has begun
redefining the extent of Government appeals allowa-
ble since the new amendment. The Court held in
United States v. Wilson 22 that the amended act now
permits a Government appeal to be made from a trial
judge's post-verdict ruling in favor of a defendant. In
United States v. Jenkins23 the Court held that the
Government could not appeal a dismissal of an
indictment where jeopardy had attached, if a second
"8See United States v. Ponto, 454 F.2d 657 (7th Cir.
1971); United States v. Findley, 439 F.2d 970 (lst Cir.
1971). Both cases involved prosecution for failure to submit
to induction. Upon review of the defendants' draft files,
both trial judges dismissed the indictments. Upon appeal,
the courts of appeals dismissed for lack of jurisdiction,
holding that the lower courts had made pretrial rulings on
the merits which could not be reviewed without violating
the double jeopardy clause.
"9Clarity is to, be desired in any statute.... When
judged in these terms, the Criminal Appeals Act is a
failure. Born of compromise, and reflecting no co-
herent allocation of appellate responsibility, the
Criminal Appeals Act proved a most unruly child that
has not improved with age.
United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267, 307 (1970).
2"S. REP. No. 1296, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1970).
211d. at 11.
22420 U.S. 332 (1975).
23420 U.S. 358 (1975).
trial would be necessary to resolve questions of fact.
In Serfass v. United States24 the Court ruled that a
dismissal of an indictment occurring before jeopardy
attached is appealable.
The defendant in Wilson, indicted for illegal
conversion of union funds, made a pretrial motion to
dismiss the indictment claiming that the delay be-
tween the offense and his indictment had prejudiced
his right to a fair trial. 2" During the trial it was
brought out that the only two men who could have
testified about the circumstances under which Wilson
received the union funds were unavailable for testi-
mony. After the jury returned a verdict of guilty, the
district court granted Wilson's pretrial motion and
dismissed the indictment.
The Government appealed the post-verdict ruling
under the newly enacted 18 U.S.C. § 3731, which
had not yet been interpreted by the Supreme Court.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit dis-
missed the Government appeal.2" In so doing the
court was strongly influenced by a Supreme Court
decision, United States v. Sisson, 27 decided under the
1968 version of the Criminal Appeals Act. Sisson
involved an appeal by the Government from an
arrest of judgment granted the defendant, following a
jury verdict of guilty. The Court found that the trial
judge had not actually rendered an arrest of judg-
ment, i.e., refusal to enter conviction because of an
error on the face of the record, but had determined
that Sisson's sincerity in opposing the Vietnam War
was a valid affirmative defense. Since the trial court's
decision was "made on the basis of evidence adduced
at trial," 28 it operated as an acquittal of the defend-
ant. Under the 1968 version of the Criminal Appeals
Act, the Government could not appeal an acquittal,
whether rendered by judge or jury.
Quite apart from the statute, it is, of course, well
settled that an acquittal can "not be reviewed, on error
or otherwise, without putting [the defendant] twice in
jeopardy and thereby violating the Constitution...
[I]n this country a verdict of acquittal, although not
followed by any judgment, is a bar to a subsequent
prosecution for the same offense." 
29
24420 U.S. 377 (1975).
25United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971), held
that the due process clause of the Constitution may mandate
a dismissal of a criminal proceeding for delay in bringing an
indictment against a defendant who can show prejudice to
his case resulting therefrom.20United States v. Wilson, 492 F.2d 1345 (3d Cir.
1973).
27399 U.S. 267 (1970).
28 Id. at 288.




The Third Circuit concluded that Sisson barred
the Government appeal in Wilson. The court found
that the district court, in granting a dismissal for
Wilson, had considered evidence brought out at trial.
The dismissal, therefore, acted as an acquittal for
double jeopardy purposes. The court did not ques-
tion the proposition that an acquittal could not be
reviewed without violating the Constitution.
Jenkins concerned a prosecution for the defend-
ant's failure to report for induction. After a bench
trial, the district court dismissed the indictment,
finding that at the time of the offense the defendant's
local draft board had failed, as required by law, to
postpone the defendant's induction until his consci-
entious objector claim was determined. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dis-
missed the Government appeal for lack of
jurisdiction."0 The Second Circuit, also relying on
Sisson, employed the same reasoning as the Third
Circuit had in Wilson: the fact that the district court
had considered evidence adduced at trial in reaching
its conclusion barred an appeal.
Serfass was also a draft case. The district court
granted defendant's pretrial motion to dismiss, find-
ing that the defendant had established a prima facie
claim of conscientious objector status which his local
draft board had ambiguously rejected, thereby pre-
judicing his right to later review. Upon appeal the
Third Circuit held that, while a Government appeal
could not have been allowed under the 1968 version
of the Criminal Appeals Act, it was permitted by the
1971 amendment. 3'
The Supreme Court allowed the Government to
appeal in Wilson and Serfass, but denied the appeal
in Jenkins. In determining the outcome of the
appeals brought in the three cases, the Supreme
Court was forced, for the first time, to determine the
precise meaning of the double jeopardy clause in the
fifth amendment of the Constitution. In each of the
cases, the Court considered that previous decisions
determining appealability of lower court orders
terminating prosecution had been strictly limited to
interpretation of common law or statutory restric-
tions on the right of Government appeal. 12 However,
the Court noted that Congress, in passing the 1971
amendment to the Criminal Appeals Act, expressed
its intention that all Government appeals constitu-
tionally permissable should be allowed. Thus, previ-
ous cases holding to the contrary were not control-
ling.
"490 F.2d 868 (2d Cir. 1973).
31492 F.2d 388 (3d Cir. 1974).
"2See notes 45-47 and accompanying text infra.
First, turning to the historical basis for the
prohibition against double jeopardy, the Court
traced the principle back to three common-law pleas:
autrefois acquit, autrefois convict, and pardon. These
pleas were available upon retrial to a defendant who
had previously been acquitted, convicted, or par-
doned of the same offense as charged. Although the
English common law limited Government appeals of
criminal prosecutions to certain situations, former
jeopardy was pleadable only at a second prosecution.
The drafters of the Bill of Rights seemed to have
had a similar notion of the concept of double jeop-
ardy. James Madison's original proposal for the
fifth amendment included a provision that "No per-
son shall be subject, except in cases of impeachment,
to more than one punishment or one trial for the
same offense."" That proposal was rejected, ap-
parently because some Congressmen feared that the
passage would be read to bar a convicted defendant
from appealing the verdict. ' Instead, "jeopardy," a
term familiar to students of Blackstone, was em-
ployed."' In reviewing the historical development
of the double jeopardy provision, the Court found no
mention by the members of the First Congress that
it would bar Government appeals; there were only
references to the prohibition of second trials for the
same offense.
From the historical analysis of double jeopardy,
the Court determined that the function of the clause
is two-fold; it protects individuals from multiple
prosecutions and from multiple punishments. Thus,
if an order terminating a prosecution can be settled
on appeal without resorting to a second trial, the
"United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 341 (1975),
citing 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 434 (1789) 11789-18241.
4 Mr. Benson thought the committee could not agree
to the amendment in the manner it stood, because its
meaning appeared rather doubtful. It says no person
shall be tried more than once for the same offence.
This is contrary to the right heretofore established;
he presumed it was intended to express what was
secured by our former constitution, that no man's
life should be more than once put in jeopardy for the
same offence; yet it was well known, that they were
entitled to more than one trial. The humane intention
of the clause was to prevent more than one punish-
ment; for which reason he would move to amend it by
striking out the words "one trial or."
2 B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY 1111 (1971).
"Blackstone used the term "jeopardy" in connection
with the right of an accused to make four special pleas in
bar: autrefois acquit, autrefois attaint, autrefois convict,
and pardon. Blackstone called the jeopardy concept a
"universal maxim of the common law of England." 4 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES* 335.
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Court will allow a Government appeal to be heard. 36
In Wilson the trial court's decision granting a
dismissal occurred after the jury found the defendant
guilty. The Court allowed an appeal to be brought
via the newly amended Criminal Appeals Act, since a
second trial would not be needed to finalize proceed-
ings. If the court of appeals finds in favor of the
Government on remand, Wilson's guilty verdict will
be reinstated.
The trial court's dismissal in Jenkins, on the other
hand, was rendered following a bench trial. Al-
though the district court filed findings of fact and
conclusions of law, the Court was unable to deter-
mine if the lower court had resolved all factual issues
against the defendant. The Court concluded that a
second trial would be necessary should a Govern-
ment appeal of the case succeed. Since the double
jeopardy protection of the Constitution prohibits
second trials, Jenkins was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.
Serfass involved a pretrial dismissal, appealable
under the old versions of the Criminal Appeals Act if
found to constitute a plea in bar." The Court found
that, although the district court had relied on factual
material found in the defendant's draft file in
dismissing the case, an appeal could be brought since
jeopardy had not yet attached.
The Court found additional support for its inter-
pretation of the Constitutional restriction in prior
case law. The Government has been permitted to
appeal one type of post-jeopardy decision favorable
to a defendant, an arrest of judgment, since the 1907
Criminal Appeals Act. An appellate court reversal of
an arrest of judgment acts to reinstate the jury
verdict, thereby not subjecting the defendant to a
second trial. Moreover an appellate court's reversal
of a defendant's conviction is subject to further
appeal initiated by the Government."8 Thus, the
"6Such a position was taken by Judge Learned Hand in
United States v. Zisblatt, 172 F.2d 740 (2d Cir.), appeal
dismissed on Government's motion, 336 U.S. 934 (1949).
Zisblatt, after receiving a guilty verdict from the jury, had
his case dismissed by the trial judge, on the grounds that the
statute of limitations barred the indictment. Hand con-
cluded that since an appeal of the dismissal would not
involve a new trial before a second jury, the double jeopardy
provision of the Constitution would not be violated by the
appeal.
So long as the verdict of guilty remains as a datum, the
correction of errors of law in attaching the proper legal
consequences to it do not trench upon the constitu-
tional prohibition.
Id. at 743.
17See United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971).
"8The Government's right to appeal the reversal of a
criminal defendant's conviction has been based on the
attachment of jeopardy is not dispositive of the
question of a Government appeal, but merely begins
the inquiry into double jeopardy considerations. The
Court analogized a post-verdict ruling of law to an
appellate court reversal of conviction. Both involve
rulings in the defendant's favor after ajury has found
him guilty. The Court could see no sense in allowing
an appellate court reversal to be reviewed further,
but not a post-verdict ruling.
The majority opinion in Wilson stated unequivo-
cally that a Government appeal would lie from a
post-verdict acquittal. The Court was faced with a
multitude of prior decisions holding that no appeal
lies from an acquittal. The Court distinguished
United States v. Ball
9 and Kepner v. United States
40
from Wilson on the ground that they were attempted
reprosecutions of defendants previously acquitted by
triers of fact. According to the Court, appeals in the
two cases violated the Constitution because a second
trial of the defendants would have been necessitated
by appeal. According to the Court in Wilson, United
States v. Sisson,4 which held that a post-verdict
theory that a defendant waives his double jeopardy protec-
tion by appealing his conviction. Once waived, the clause
will not shield him from further review. See Green v.
United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957). The notion of waiving
one's constitutional rights has been criticized. See Kepner v.
United States, 195 U.S. 100, 135 (1904) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting). The result obtained in Wilson could be ex-
plained by this principle. A defendant requesting a post-
verdict decision of law favorable to himself may be viewed
as having waived his objections to further judicial review.
39163 U.S. 662 (1896). Ball had been acquitted by jury
of a murder charge. When the indictment upon which he
was tried was found defective, he was reprosecuted and
convicted. The Supreme Court reversed upon appeal.
Contrary to the practice of the English common law, a
verdict upon a defective indictment was held to be voidable
only by a convicted defendant, not by the Government
following an acquittal.
The verdict of acquittal was final, and could not be
reviewed, on error or otherwise, without putting him
in jeopardy, and thereby violating the Constitution.
Id. at 671.
4. 195 U.S. 100 (1904). Kepner had been charged with
and acquitted of embezzlement of funds by a court sitting on
bench in the Philippine Islands. An appeals court then
reversed his acquittal. The Supreme Court discharged the
prisoner.
The court of first instance, having jurisdiction to try
the question of the guilt or innocence of the accused,
found Kepner not guilty; to try him again on the
merits, even in an appellate court is to put him a sec-
ond time in jeopardy for the same offense.
Id. at 133. It is unclear from the text of Kepner whether the
Court reversed on the basis of preserving the verdict of the
first trier of fact, or whether the Court held appellate review
of an acquittal would itself violate the Constitution.
41399 U.S. 267 (1970).
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decision favorable to the defendant could not be
reviewed if the decision was based on evidence
adduced at trial, dealt only with the 1968 version of
the Criminal Appeals Act and was, therefore, also
distinguishable.
Justices Douglas and Brennan filed a dissenting
opinion in Wilson and a concurrence in Jenkins.
They urged that the Court follow the Sisson standard
in determining appealability of post-verdict decisions
favorable to the defendant. The issue of a speedy trial
in Wilson was "part and parcel of the process of
weighing the Government's evidentiary case against
respondent." 4 2 The dissenting justices objected to an
appellate court review of evidentiary aspects of a
criminal case. Wilson does represent an expansive
departure from the category of lower court material
which an appeals court may review upon the
Government's request. For example, if a trial judge
grants a post-verdict acquittal for insufficiency of the
evidence,"' a Government appeal will necessitate
review of all the evidence produced at trial. However,
courts of appeals have regularly reviewed records of
criminal proceedings for sufficiency of evidence fol-
lowing appeals by convicted defendants. That the
Government should also have that privilege is not
catastrophic.
Wilson, Jenkins, and Serfass provide clear-cut,
definitive rules on the appealability of decisions
terminating a prosecution in the defendant's favor. In
the past the circumstances under which a case might
have been appealed or retried remained unclear. The
Court, in deciding these double jeopardy cases,
ronsidered two questions. First, has jeopardy "at-
tached," i.e., has the jury been empaneled in a jury
trial, 4 or has the court begun to hear evidence in a
bench trial?' If jeopardy has not attached, an appeal
may be brought." If jeopardy has attached, a second
inquiry is necessary: can an appeal be settled against
the defendant without subjecting him to a second
trial? If it cannot, the double jeopardy provision of
the Constitution prohibits the appeal.
"United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 357 (1975)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
" FED. R. CRIM. P. 29.
"See Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963).
"See Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 688 (1949).
"Jeopardy does not attach in the English common law
until a verdict of acquittal or conviction has been reached. J.
SIGLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY 15 (1969). The Court's analy-
sis of the mandate of the double jeopardy clause departed
from the common law requirements on this point. Applying
the English standard for double jeopardy attachment, the
decision in Jenkins is clearly wrong; a defendant who has
not received a final verdict has not been put injeopardy and
can be retried in the English courts.
In deciding Wilson, Jenkins, and Serfass, the
Court relied heavily on the common law and the
debates of the First Congress in illuminating the fifth
amendment provision against double jeopardy.
Other constitutional guarantees presented in the Bill
of Rights have not undergone such historical treat-
ment. The protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures, right against self-incrimination, right
to counsel, etc., afforded the criminal defendant
today are much more extensive than the drafters of
such amendments would have envisioned." 7 The
Court's determination of the requirements of some
constitutional privileges seems to vary with prevail-
ing opinions as to what is fair to defendants, given
current practices of law enforcement. " Indeed, prior
"The expansion of certain individual guarantees con-
tained in the Bill of Rights has met considerable criticism.
Justice Black, dissenting in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S.
41 (1967), decried the Court's application of the exclusion-
ary rule to evidence obtained through unreasonable wire-
tapping on two bases: first, that the plain language of the
fourth amendment and its legislative history indicate no
intention to exclude unreasonably obtained evidence; sec-
ond, that the fourth amendment clearly is aimed at
unreasonable searches and seizure of tangible items, rather
than the spoken word. Justice Black viewed the Court's
decision as judicial usurption of legislative power. Id. at 70
(Black, J., dissenting).
Justice White criticized the Court's holding in Escobedo
v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), that the refusal by police to
provide an accused with counsel during interrogation was a
violation of his sixth amendment rights, as an overly-broad
interpretation of the amendment not justified by public
policy interests. The Justice fantasized that the Court's new
approach in interpreting sixth amendment rights would
lead eventually to a requirement that counsel be present
before a potential defendant even commits a crime, since the
offense, itself, involves possibilities of self-incrimination. Id.
at 497 (White, J., dissenting).
The privilege against self-incrimination has also under-
gone an expansive change. The fifth amendment provides
that no one "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The
protection has been interpreted to apply to production of
documents, police interrogation situations, and statutes
with registration and reporting requirements, going beyond
the obvious intentions of the framers of the Constitution. H.
Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for
Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REv. 671 (1968).
"The Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966), placed considerable emphasis on the current tactics
of law enforcement officials to justify the Court's conclusion
that the so-called Miranda warnings were constitutionally
mandated. One must wonder what would happen to the
requirement of warning should the tactics change. Justice
White, dissenting in Miranda, did not object to the
expansion of the fifth amendment guarantee against self-
incrimination on historical grounds, but on the basis of the
wisdom of the holding.
That the Court's holding today is neither compelled
nor even strongly suggested by the language of the
[Vol. 66
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eases dealing with the double jeopardy clause have
advocated flexibility in determining its application. 41
In laying down the specific requirements of the
double jeopardy clause, the Court makes binding on
the states5 0 specific rules of criminal procedure. "
In any event, to base the requirements of the clause
upon the common law of England or the debates of
the First Congress is speculative, at best. The double
jeopardy principle, "Nemo debet vis bexari pro una
et eadem causa," was a mere maxim of the common
law which was only sporadically followed.5 2 Reli-
ance upon the debates of the First Congress, in
particular upon omissions of topics in the debates, to
determine the meaning of the constitutional provision
is questionable. Whether the First Congress made a
distinction between appeals and second trials, for the
purposes of the fifth amendment, cannot be deter-
mined by the debates. Since the common law limited
appeals in criminal cases to very specific instances,
the founding fathers may not have even considered
Fifth Amendment, is at odds with American and Eng-
lish legal history, and involves a departure from a long
line of precedent does not prove either that the Court
has exceeded its powers or that the Court is wrong or
unwise in its present reinterpretation of the Fifth
Amendment ... what it has done is to make new law
and new public policy in much the same way that it
has in the course of interpreting other great clauses of
the Constitution. This is what the Court has histori-
cally done. Indeed, it is what it must do and will con-
tinue to do until and unless there is some fundamental
change in the constitutional distribution of the govern-
mental powers. (footnotes omitted)
Id. at 531 (White, J., dissenting).
4 9See Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973); Wade
v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 690 (1949).
5"The fifth amendment provision against double jeop-
ardy has been held applicable to the states through the
fourteenth amendment. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784
(1969).
"The Supreme Court's insistence upon converting the
Bill of Rights into a uniform code of criminal procedure has
been considered by Judge Friendly. The Court has increas-
ingly applied stringent procedural requirements on the
states concerning their pretrial and trial practices of dealing
with criminal defendants. Friendly concluded that, not only
was the Court's supervision of state criminal procedure in
conflict with the clear intentions of the framers of the
Constitution, but it was also unwise to so interfere for two
major reasons. First, the specific requirements of the Bill of
Rights varied with the composition of the Court, causing
the states needless confusion as to the mandates of the
Constitution. Second, forcing the states to adhere to proce-
dural rules discourages experimentation with alternative
methods of arriving at the truth in trial. Friendly, The Bill
of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L.
REV. 929 (1965).
5
J. SIGLER, DOUBLEJEOPARDY 4-21 (1969).
the issue of appealability of decisions not requiring a
second trial. "
The essence of the Court's analysis of the double
jeopardy principle is its determination that the main
interest of the constitutional clause is to protect
defendants from overly zealous prosecutors. The
prohibition against second trials guarantees that a
prosecutor will not be tempted to try to convince a
second trier of fact of a defendant's guilt, after having
failed with a first. The double jeopardy clause
discourages prosecutors and judges from causing
mistrials should the Government's case be going
poorly. An appeal of a decision of law rendered after
a guilty verdict, however, involves no opportunity for
such prosecutorial or judicial abuse. In a previous
decision, Green v. United States, 54 the Court pointed
to a more extensive list of interests in the double
jeopardy provision:
The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at
least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is
that the State with all its resources and power should
not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an
individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting
him to embarassment, expense and ordeal and compel-
ling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and
insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that
even though innocent he may be found guilty. "
Certain of these considerations are not affected by
the decision in Wilson, allowing appeal of post-ver-
dict rulings favorable to a defendant. An appeal can
cause a defendant added anxiety and expense as
surely as a second trial can. A defendant who has
been acquitted by a trial judge has as much interest
in the finality of lower court proceedings as does the
defendant who has been acquitted by a jury. Hence,
the Court sometimes eschews its own rationale in
reaching its recent decisions.
"A Maryland proposal for the Bill of Rights had
provided "that there can be no appeal from matter of fact,
or second trial after acquittal." B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF
RIGHTS: A DOCUMNTARY HISTORY 732 (1971). Why this
proposal was not adopted cannot be determined from the
scanty records of the Bill of Rights debates.
A more open approach to the resolution of double
jeopardy restrictions in Wilson would have placed greater
emphasis on what is fair to both society and the accused in a
criminal proceeding. In United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S.
463 (1964), the Court followed such a bent in deciding the
applicability of the doublejeopardy provision to a defendant
whose first trial had resulted in a mistrial.
Corresponding to the right of an accused to be given a
fair trial is the societal interest in punishing one whose
guilt is clear after he has obtained such a trial.
Id. at 466.
5355 U.S. 184 (1957).
"5 Id. at 187-88.
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FIFTH AMENDMENT
While Wilson, Jenkins, and Serfass provide defini-
tive rules on the appealability of decisions terminat-
ing a prosecution in the defendant's favor, it is
questionable whether such clear-cut rules can be
formulated for other areas of criminal law which con-
cern double jeopardy considerations. For example,
double jeopardy cases decided by the Supreme Court
which involve defendants receiving mistrials appear
to be haphazardly decided. Although the Court still
adheres to the principle cited in United States v.
Perez, 56 that a retrial will be permitted whenever
"manifest necessity" forces a trial judge to declare a
mistrial, recent Court decisions involving mistrials
have not alvays followed that formula. 5 Instead, the
Court has advocated a policy of flexibility in deter-
mining whether retrial should be allowed. 5
A probable effect of the decisions in Wilson,
Jenkins, and Serfass will be a new emphasis on the
point in proceedings at which a decision terminating
prosecution is rendered. Since the Court has held
that the fifth amendment is not violated by appeal of
any decision rendered before jeopardy has attached,
defense counsel should be encouraged to delay some
5622 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824). Perez involved the
retrial of a defendant whose first trial resulted in a hung
jury.
5"Four recent Court decisions reflect shifting standards
toward allowing retrial of defendants receiving mistrials. In
Cori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364, 369 (1961), a retrial
was allowed of a defendant who obtained an unrequested
mistrial from a trial judge, where the decision was "in the
sole interest of the defendant." The Court did not reach the
question of the manifest necessity of the lower court ruling.
Instead, it seemed most concerned with the determination of
which party benefited most from the mistrial. In Downum
v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963), the Court refused to
allow retrial of a defendant whose mistrial was caused by
the unavailability of a key witness to the prosecution.
Although there was no evidence of prosecutorial abuse in
Downum, the Court saw the potential for abuse in allowing
prosecutors to obtain a mistrial on the basis of the
unpreparedness of the Government's case. In United States
v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971), the Court prohibited retrial of
a defendant whose mistrial was granted by a trial judge
concerned that witnesses for the prosecution consult their
own attorneys before testifying. Here the Court found that
the trial judge had abused his discretion. Jorn emphasized
preservation of the first jury whenever possible. The fact
situation of Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973), was
similar to that of Downum, with disparate results. After
having empaneled a jury, the prosecutor discovered that the
indictment upon which defendant was charged was incura-
bly defective. A mistrial was declared. The defendant was
found guilty at retrial, despite his plea of double jeopardy.
The Supreme Court allowed retrial of Somerville, finding
that the state's interest in conducting an error-free prosecu-
tion outweighed the interest of the defendant in proceeding
to verdict with his first jury.
58See note 49 and accompanying text supra.
motions to dismiss until jeopardy has attached."9 A
ruling of law terminating a prosecution after jeop-
ardy has attached, yet before resolution of a factual
questions, cannot be appealed, as a second trial
would be necessary should the appeal succeed. Thus,
defense counsel should seek a favorable ruling of law
before a verdict is reached. In Jenkins Justice
Rehnquist suggests that the case might have been
appealable had the district court more carefully
entered its complete findings of fact and law. "' If the
record clearly shows that a court has resolved all
questions of fact against the defendant, but has ruled
in his favor on a legal ground, a Government appeal
is permissible. The Government should be en-
couraged by this statement to request in future
criminal proceedings that a district court sitting on
bench enter its finding of fact and law when ruling
for the defendant. Determining whether an appeal
may be brought from a decision of law on the basis of
the stage of proceeding in which it was rendered
may seem to smack of technicality. A defendant who
has been subjected to a criminal trial through the
jury verdict, before having a decision in his favor,
may be exposed to an appeal. The defendant whose
ruling comes mid-trial is not. However, it must also
be remembered that the defendant whose dismissal
comes after a jury verdict has had his chance to
convince the trier of fact of his innocence and has
failed.
The Criminal Appeals Act, as amended, is a
response to a growing number of procedural hurdles
which a prosecution must clear in order to obtain a
conviction. Specifically, the expanded use of discov-
ery orders and suppression hearings has frustrated
federal prosecutors, in particular when the orders
were not subject to appeal. Easing of the long-stand-
ing Court policy of discouraging Government ap-
peals in criminal cases 6 t may have the desirable effect
of restriking a balance that is still tilted in the
criminal defendant's favor. 62
"5The First Circuit, refusing to hear an appeal of a
pretrial dismissal in United States v. Findley, 439 F.2d 970
(1st Cir. 1971), expressed fear that emphasis on the stage in
the proceeding at which dismissal occurred would lead to
inefficiency of the legal system. The court felt that smart
counsel would wait to present a defense on the merits until
jeopardy had attached, thereby defeating the purpose of the
pretrial motion, to speed the disposition of criminal pro-
ceedings.
60420 U.S. 358, 367 (1975).
6"[A]ppeals by the Government in criminal cases are
something unusual, exceptional, not favored." Carroll v.
United States, 354 U.S. 394, 400 (1957).
"2Justice Holmes, dissenting in Kepner v. United States,
195 U.S. 100 (1904) expressed his opinion: "At the present
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The Supreme Court, in response to the newly
amended Criminal Appeals Act, has taken a defini-
tive stance on the application of the constitutional
prohibition against double jeopardy to Government
appeal of decisions terminating a criminal prosecu-
tion in the defendant's favor. Once jeopardy has
time in this country there is more danger that criminals will
escape justice than that they will be subjected to tyranny."
Id. at 134 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Many would probably
agree that his statement is applicable today.
attached, the Constitution bars appeal of those
decisions which would require a second trial to
finalize proceedings. Although not firmly rooted in
the judicial history of the fifth amendment, the
Court's position has merit. The Government, at last,
has a standard by which to appraise whether an
appeal may be taken. The intention of the Ninety-
First Congress to equalize the balance between
protection of the criminal defendant and the interests
of justice, within the limitations imposed by the fifth
amendment, has been facilitated.
